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PROMISE VS. PERFORMANCE: WHY PUBUC SUBSIDIES
OF PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT ARE NOT LIKELY
TO PRODUCE FAIR RETURNS TO
THE TAXPAYING PUBLIC
By Marc Knapp
I.

Introduction

On September 10, 2013, the Baltimore City Council gave tinal approval to Harbor Point, a $1 billion multi-use project to be built on a
vacant, remediated brownfield that juts into Baltimore's Inner Harbor. I Like many urban development or redevelopment projects, Harbor Point will be supported by significant taxpayer subsidies. Between
a $107 million direct investment in project-related infrastructure largely parks that will surround the to-be-built offices, shops and residences, and a waterfront promenade 2 - along with a mixed bag of real
estate and income tax incentives,~ the visible public support to Harbor
Point will exceed $200 million,4 20% of projected total investment. As
with all such projects, Harbor Point's pre-approval advocacy was rife
with promises of jobs, revitalization, and eventual increased tax
revenues. 5
This paper examines the gap between promise and performance
when it comes to taxpayer financed subsidies of private development
projects,6 with a focus on the ways that taxpayer financing subsidies
are rationalized by elected officials and sold to the public. 7 If there is
a promise or performance gap that we, might wish to close as planners
and taxpayers, we must understand its root causes.
l. Pat Warren, BallimfYfe City Council Approves $1OUM j()r Harbor Point Develop-ment, CBS BALTIMORE. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/
2013/09/10/balt-city-council-approves-100m-for-harbor-point-development/.
2. Gerald Neily, Harbor Point: Do we mally nel!d $80 million in bells and whi~tWs?,
BALTIMORE BREW Gune 7, 2013), hups:/ /www.baltimorebrew.com/20l3/
06/071 har bor-poin t-do-we-really-need-8O-mi llion-in-bells-and-whistles/ .
3. See id.
4. Natalie Sherman, Lead(Jrs Celebrate Harbor Point Croundbreaking, THE BALTI·
MORE SUN (Feb 25, 2013), http://www.ba1tirnoresun.com/business/real-estate/wonk/bs-bz-harbor-point-groundbreaking-20150225-story.htm!'
5. Neily, supra note 2.
6. Tim Pula, The HarbfYf Point TIF Makes Sense, THE BALTIMORE SUN (July 1,
2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 20 13-07-0 1/ news/bs-ed-harborpoint-tif-2013070 l_l_tax-abatement-tax-rebate-tifs.
7. See irifm Part V.d.
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Is There a Promise or Perlormance Gap when Private Development Is Subsidized by Public Money?

Generally speaking, to quality for direct public financing subsidies
(i.e. debt issued by a state or municipality to support a project as opposed to tax credits or abatements), the private project in question
must have some nexus to a public purpose or benefit. s Universallyasserted benefits are jobs and neighborhood revitalization that will
lead to future increased tax revenues.
The public benefit requirement presents an opportunity for misdirection by the politicians, bureaucrats, labor leaders, and developers
who advocate in favor of specific projects. 9 It is easy to assert a benefit
that the public wants to believe in like lower taxes or jobs, easier than
it is to argue against.!O This results in vague and non-quantified
claims being set forth, for example "high paying jobs" instead of "X
number of jobs with a median salary of Y." Vagueness is a boon for
subsidy advocates - how can you hold them accountable for a shortfall
if they never said how much in the first place and a bane for academicians - how can you conduct a promise or performance shortfall study
if the promise was never spelled out? The result is a scarcity of studies
dealing with the efficacy of private activity finance insofar as realization of public objectives is concerned. Lynne Sagalyn opined that
"not even [general principals of good public/private development]
exist. We lack systematic evaluation of actual practice."11
Notwithstanding a dearth of studies, a number of sources have criticized private activity finance. 12 An in-depth exploration of such criticism is beyond the scope of this article. SufIice it to say that the thrust
of the most common objections to private activity financial subsidies
are the adverse impact of locally approved subsidies on federal tax
revenues and the general immorality of corporate welfare. 13 Little has
been written about the life-of-project costs of such subsidies that are
incurred by state and local taxpayers. It is as if many commentators
view private activity subsidies as cost-free - many commentators, but
not all. 14
See IRS PUBLICATION 5005 (4-2012).
See infra Part V.e.
Neily, mpra note 2.
Lynne B .. Sagalyn, Public/Private, DeueloptMnt: Lessons from Hi~t(}ry, &search,
and PractIce, 73 J. AM. PlAN. Ass N 7 (2007).
12. See Government. Accountability Office, Limiting the Tax-Exempt Status oj' Certain Governmental Bonds Could Yield, GAO-OS-364 (200S), available at http:/ /
www.gao.gov/modules/ereport/handler.php?I=I&path=/ereport/GAO11-31SSP /data_center_savings/General~overnment/Limiting_the_tax
8.
9.
ID.
11.

exempcstatus_oCcertain~overnmentaLbonds_could_yield_revenue.

13. David Brunori, VVlwe is the Outrage Over Corporate Welfare?, FOIlliES (Mar. 14,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/03/I4/where-is-theoutrage-over-corporate-welfare / .
14. Mary Williams Walsh & Louise Story, A Stealth Tax Subsidy for Business Faces
New Scrutiny, NY TIMES (March 4, 2013), hup:/ /www.nytirnes.com/2013/
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Mary Wash and Louise Story writing in The New York Times characterized private activity financings as a "stealth tax" .15 They cited several instances of apparent abuse: a winery in North Carolina, a golf
course in Puerto Rico, a Corvette museum in Kentucky, and the corporate offices of Goldman Sachs and Bank of America in Manhattan. Hi The problem with these projects, according to Wash and Story,
is that they will not yield enough incremental revenue for the municipal debt issuers that financed them to enable those issuers to service
the debt they issued in support of these project~ without tapping into
other sources - e.g. diverting taxes from other uses.17
Camden Yards (home of the Baltimore Orioles) and M&T Bank Stadium (where the Baltimore Ravens play) are stealth tax examples in
close proximity to Harbor Point. These stadia are publically owned
and were buill at a total cost that exceeded $600 million. It-! According
to financial statements filed by the Maryland Stadium Authority (the
operator of these stadia), the Authority runs a deficit (and has done
so for years) that requires a $20 million annual cash infusion from
out"ide sources (i.e. Maryland taxpayers) to remain solvenL IY
Whatever was promised when dlese stadia were built, it is safe to say
that the promise was not "$600 million down and $20 million per year
thereafter." From a dollars and cents taxpayer perspective, these stadia are terrible deals. If we assume that Baltimore's municipal investments should return at least 5% annually,20 Camden Yards and M&T
03/05/ business/ qualified-private-ac tivi ty-honds-come-unde r-new-sc ru ti n y
.htm1?pagewanted~all&J~O.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Jd. Besides the financing cost subsidy, subsidized projects often benefit by
being eligible for tax-rree equipment purchases and abated real estate
taxes. 'd. These subsidies are tax expenditures that reduce what otherwise
would have been received by the debt-issuing municipalities. !d. Hence they
are an actual cost to local taxpayers who must replace the funds. ld.
18. KATE DAVIS & CIIAUNA BROCHT WITH PHIL MAITF.RA & CRF.G LERoy, GOOD
JOBS FIRST, SUBSmnlNG THF. Low Ro/m: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TN BALTI·
MORE 39-55 (2002), available at hup:! /www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/ tiles/ docs/ pdf/baIt. pdf. At $600 million for two stadiums, Maryland
taxpayers got a bargain. Jd. Washington, DC paid the same for just one
stadium, Nationals Park. See David Cranor, Was National5 Pa.rk Worth it far
DC?, GREATER GREATER WASHINGTON (Aug. 27, 2013) http://greatergreaterwashington.org/ post/19849 / was-nationals-park-worth-it-for-dc/.
19. See MARYLAND STADIUM AUTHOIUn', 2011 ANNUAL REpORT, 54-57 (2011),
available at http://www.mdstad.com/pdf/msa-2011·annual-report.pdf; MARYlAND STADIUM AUTHORIty, 2012 ANNUAl. REPORT 43-45 (20J2), availahle at
hup:/ /www.mdstad.com/pdf!msa-2012-annual-report.pdf; MARYLANl) STADIUM AUTHORIty, 2013 ANNUAL REpORT 10-13 (2013), availahle at http:/ /
www.rndstad.com/pdf! msa-20 13-an nual-re port. pdf.
20. An taxpayer-funded investments must generate a return. Investments in education should return educated children. Investment in police should return safer streets. And investments in commercial enterprises (such as
sports stadiums) should return cash. See Adam M. Zaretsky, Should Cities Pay
Jor Sport Facilities?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (April 200l), hups:/ /
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Bank Stadium combined are short of target by $50 million without any
consideration for recoupment of initial principle. ~1 Apologists might
say that the direct cash shortfall is covered by ancillary economic activity such as increases in sales taxes and employment. But if the current
$50 million annual shortiaJI (assuming a modest 5% return and forgetting the need to recoup the invested principle) were to be covered
entirely by sales taxes, given Maryland's 6% sales tax rate, incremental
annual sales would have to exceed $800 million. 22 To say that these
incremental sales are taking place in dose proximity to the stadia is
simply not supportable by fact. There are only 25 or so bars and restaurants - the principal businesses (along with parking) that benefit
from game-day spending - within reasonable walking distance of Camden Yards and none within reasonable walking distance of M&T Bank
Stadium. 23 These 25 bars and restaurants are obviously not selling
$800 million dollars worth of more beer and burgers each year. 24 To
say that direct job growth is what makes up for the cash return
shortfall is likewise not supportable by fact. The bulk of the stadium
jobs are low wage 25 - food and souvenir vendors, and cleaners - and
part time - the Orioles play 81 games a year at home and the Ravens
play just ten. To say that parking taxes are filling the void is likewise a
stretch. If every game were a sell-out and every attendee drove his or
her own car, per game parking fees would have to equal $45 (which is
higher than is actually the case in downtown Baltimore).26 A more
realistic assumption of the ratio of parked cars to parked bottoms in

2l.

22.
23 .

24.

25.

26.

www.stlouisfed.org/Publicatiolls/Regional-Economist/April-2001/ShouldCities-Pay-for-Sports-Facilities.
$600,000,000 (total'public investment in Camden Yards and M&T Bank Stadium) * 5% '" $30,000,000 (target annual return on investment).
$30,000,000 (not realized) plus $20,000,000 (annual public contribution to
cover deficit) = $50,000,000 (total nct shortfall).
$833,333,333 (total taxable sales) * 6% (Maryland sales tax rate) '"
$50,000,000.
Restaurants near M&T Bank Stadium, COOGLE MAFs, https:/ /www.google
.com/maps (search for M&T Bank Stadium; click on "nearby restaurants"
hyperlink) .
At $2.1') per person, the 25 bars/restaurants near Camden Yards would have
to average more than 1 1/4 million incremenLal meals each - roughly 16,000
each Orioles home game - to get over $800 million in additional sales.
[$25/mcal * 25 (bars) * 1,333,333 (meals/bar) '" $833,333,333 (taxable
sales revenues); 1,333,333 meals spread over 81 regular season home games
= 16,460 meals per home game].
See Charlie Vascellaro, The Vendors oJ Camden Yards, BALTIMORE STYLE Guly/
Aug. ~OlO), available at htlp:/ /www.baltimorestyle.com/index.php/style/
people/peoplc_camdcn_yardsjalO/. Vendors al Camden Yards work on
tips and commissions only. Good ones average $200 to $300 per game. /d.
At $250 per game, 81 home games and a good season for the Orioles, a
good vendor will make roughly $20,000 a year. All Pro Vending supplies the
vendors for M&T Bank Stadium. Irl. The base commission for M&T Bank
Stadium vendors is 12%. Id.
See Baltimore Parking, BALTIMORE BEST PARKING http://baltimore.bestpark
ing.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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stadium seats, would push the needed parking fee to over $100, and at
that price, few game-goers would drive. 27 So, although there are no
definitive fact.o;; in support of this conclusion, I can say with certainty
that Baltimore's stadia have been money losers for Maryland
taxpayers.
III.

What Is a "TIF" and How Does It Differ from Other Forms of
Municipal Debt?

Since half the visible subsidy for Harbor Point will come from a
$107 million TIF28 (UTax Increment Financing"), the proceeds of
which will fund pre-development infrastructure, it is important to understand what a TIF is, how it differs from other instruments of municipal finance, and how the concept was sold to the public.
Typically, a tax increment financing project works as follows.
When the project is begun, the assessed value of the project
area is frozen for purposes of determining how much tax revenue each municipal taxing entity will receive from the area
during the first phase. Usually the city must expend money
to acquire and clear land or otherwise improve property
within the project area in order to make it more attractive to
private developers. Until these cost.'i incurred by the municipality are repaid through increased tax revenue due to increased property values after redevelopment, the city and all
other taxing entities will continue to receive tax revenue
based on the frozen valuation (the tax base), whether the
actual value of the property in the pr~ject area declines, as it
sometimes does initiaUy, or increases due to redevelopment
activity. Property owners in the area pay the full amount of
tax due on the actual value of the property, and after the
property value has risen above the initial assessed value, the
increased tax revenue is put into a special fund which is used
by the municipality to pay its development cost~. When all
the city's costs have been paid, including payments on
bonds, the area's valuation is unfrozen and all taxing districts
benefit from the increa<;e in property values. 29
TIFs are not new. They have been around for more than 50 years,30
and are widely used throughout the U.S.!!l TIl's are especially valua27. If eaeh car held two people, the break-even parking fee doubles to $90. At
three people per car, the required parking fee triples to $1 :15.
28. Baltimore Dev. Corp., Harbor Point Tax Inrrement Financin[; Fact and Information Sheet, BALTIMORE DEV. CORP. Ullne 3, 2013), http://baltimoredevclopment.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/harbor-pointfact-sheet.pdf.
29. Christina G. Dudley, Tax Increment Finandng far Redevelopment in Missour-i:
Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77 (1985).
30. See id.
31. Tax Increment Financing, WIKlPEDlA, http://en.wikipcdia.org/wiki/Tax_in
c['ement_financing (last visited Feb. 11,2015).
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ble when it comes to big-ticket subsidies. Unlike other municipal project finance structures, TIF issuance caps, individually and in the
aggregate, are locally set. 32 This means that only the issuers' common
sense provides a brake on TIF issuance. 33 Also, on the surface, TIFs
appear to the uninitiated (i.e. the taxpayer) to be revenue bonds with
dedicated sources of debt service and hence, have with no claim
against the municipal treasuries. 34 But unlike true revenue bonds, if
the dedicated revenue source for a TIF falls short of debt servicing
needs, the issuers are obligated to service the TIF using general revenues.3!:i TIFs, therefore, are general obligation bonds (GOs) disguised
as revenue bonds.
There is a specific issue that affects TIFs that does not affect other
instruments of municipal finance. As noted, to make them look like
revenue bonds, TIFs are structured so as to dedicate incremental, project-produced tax revenues to their service.1$6 Until TIFs are paid off,
the issuing municipalities realize no net tax benefits from TIF-financed prqjects. 37 The delayed-benefits aspect of TIFs can cause
problems, potentially major problems, that do not attach to other
forms of municipal finance.
Suppose, for example, that the pre-development real estate taxes
generated by a TIF-eligibJe, blighted part of town are $1,000 per year,
and the cost of providing public services (police, fire, road maintenance, teachers' salaries, pensions, healthcarc benefits to employees
and retirees, etc.) to that area arc $2,000. This means that in Year-I,
other sections of that municipality must subsidize the blighted area to
the tune of $1,000. Over a ten year period, assuming no inflation, the
aggregate subsidy will come to $10,000. But there is always inflation.
Assuming a modest 2% annual inflation rate that impacts both revenues and public service costs equally, the annual subsidy would grow
from $1,000 in Year-1 to $1,195 in Year-10, and the ten year aggregate
subsidy would climb from $10,000 to $10,950.?'8
Asked"QT~estions, BERWYN DEV. CORP.
http://www.berwyn.net/tif-frequently-a~ked-questions (last visited Feb. 24,

32. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., TIF Frequently

2015).
33. See £d. With local control of TIFs they are generally only subject to the common sense of the locality. Id.
34. See, e.g., LR.C. § 146 (2014); IRS PUBLICATION 4079 (REv. 9-2005), CATALOG
No. 34663R, Tax·Exempt Governmental Bonds, 4-5; IRS PUBI.lCATION 5005 (42012), CATAl.OG No. 59471F, Your Responsibilities As a Conduit Issuer of TaxExempt Bonds, 5-6. Revenue bonds are serviced outside the issuer's general
tax revenue stream, and are subject to federally-imposed issuance caps. GO
issuance is limited by state and local ordinances. TIFs, thus, can be issued
for very large amounts. Id.
35. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., supra note 32.
36. [d.
37. [d.

:18. See infra Table I ..
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The $10,950 aggregate subsidy is what would be the case if there
were no TIF. With a T1F, the municipality's general fund's share of
real estate taxes from the blighted area is locked at $1,000 per year
until the TIF is retired. 39 This means that the Year-I 0 subsidies from
other parts of the city (keeping our other assumptions unchanged
and assuming the TIF will be outstanding for at least ten years) will
rise from $1,195 to $1,390,40 and the aggregate shortfall will rise from
$10,950 to $11,900. 41
But that is not all. A revitalized urban area will likely demand a
higher level of municipal services than did a blighted area. 42 Suppose, for example, that the municipal service burden was to double.
This will drive the cumulative ten-year shortfall that must be met either by additional debt or by subsidies from other parts of the city to
$33,800,4~ triple what it would have been had there not been a TlF
issued for the blighted area's redevelopment. 44
The numbers I have used are by way of example only. Although
every case is different, the principle holds. TlFs have hidden costs
and risks not presented by other forms of municipal financing structures. By dedicating a project's incremental revenues to paying for
the public's investment in a TIF-financed project, we inevitably, in the
short run, increa"e the tax burden on, or reduce the amount of
money available to, other areas of the TIF-issuing municipality.4.">
Since a big-ticket TIF may be outstanding for a fairly long time (the
Harbor Point TIF finally matures in 2049) the "short run" may not be
so short. 46 A municipality that goes overboard issuing TIFs without
considering this spillover effect could conceivably find itself bankrupt
before it realized any of the delayed benefits from its redevelopment
activities no matter how successfully its TIF-financed projects were tu

39. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., supm note 32.
40. See infra Table 2.
41. See infra Table 2.
42. JOHN CONLFY & MANFRED DIX, BENEFICIAL INEQUALlTY IN THE PROVISION OF
MUNICIPAL SERVICES 6-7 (2002).
43. See infra Table 3.
44. Compare infra Table 1, with Table 3.
45. See Dudley, supra note 29, at I; Walsh & Story, supra note 14 (if a project is
funded by a GO, although the total costs may be the same as with a TIF, the
issuer's flexibility is greatly increased. Also, the budgetary impact of a GO is
far more transparent than is the case with a TIF).
46. MuniCap, Inc., Baltimore Harbor 71F - Projection No. 3D-B, BALTIMORE DEV.
CORP. (May 17, 2013), hup:/ /baltimoredevelopment.com!wp-content!
u ploads/20 14 / 08/harbor-point-bond-projcction. pdf.
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turn out. 47 TIFs, in other words, exemplifY The New York Times' concept of a "stealth tax".48

N.

Maryland's New TIF Legislation - A Primer on How Private Activity Finance Is Sold to the Public

Maryland has new TIF legislation - HB 613 that was enacted in
2013. 49 The bill's introductory paragraph, in particular, is worthy of
repeating:
AN ACT concerning Sustainable Communities - Designation
and Financing
FOR the purpose of authorizing municipalities and certain
counties to finance the cost of certain infrastructure improvements in a sustainable community in the same manner as
a transit-oriented development under certain circumstances; authorizing a political subdivision to use certain alternative local tax revenues for tax increment financing in
connection with a sustainable community under certain circumstances; providing that bonds can be used for certain
purposes in sustainable communities under certain circumstances; authorizing a political subdivision to determine a
certain base of a certain brownfields site in a sustainable community under certain circumstances; authorizjng a political
subdivision to pledge tax increment revenue to secure the
payment of obligations to the Maryland Economic Develop~
ment Corporation for infrastructure improvements located
in a sustainable community; providing for the construction of
this Act; providing that certain political subdivisions will get
priority for State funding under certain circumstances; defining and altering certain terms; providing that the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore City may use certain authority
granted under State law to a political subdivision for tax in47. A municipality that issues TIFs realizes no benefit from increased taxes
from the redeveloped blighted area as these incremental taxes must be
used to service the TIF. Until the TIF is fully paid orf, other sections of the
city must subsidize the increased municipal services costs of the
redeveloped blighted area.
48. See Walsh & Story, supra note 14. For a further discussion of this TlF.specific
problem See Redevelopment: The unknown government, MUNIC1PAI. OFFICIAI.S
FOR REDEVELOPMENT REFORM
(Sept. 2002), http://www.coalitionforredeve lop men treform.org/ references/ morrreport. ph p. Since this problem
has been known for over a decade, one might wonder why it has not been
more widely publicized. The answer, I suspect, is politics. Our elected officials are more motivated by the short term benefits they realb:e from development project~ - improved reelection chances - than they are deterred by
problems that might not surface for decades, long after they have retired or
moved on to other office.
49. RB. 613, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
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crement financing in a sustainahle community for certain purposes; ... and generally relating to sustainable communities. 50
Since the phrases "sustainable community" and "sustainable communities" appear eight times in the introduction to HB 613, one
might reasonably conclude that sustainable communities are central
to Maryland's TIY program. 51 If the Maryland TlF legislation is "Son
of Sustainable Communities", it is important that we know the definition of a sustainable community.
Su:;tainable communities are defined by the Sustainable Communities Act of 2010 52 (SB 285, an extension of the earlier Heritage Tax
Credit program), and the means for designating one is codified in
MD Housing & Community Development § 6-205.1>".
Since its code is less than understandable to lay persons, to explain
5B 285 to the public, Maryland published a pamphlet titled Sustainahle
Community Act of 2010.
No program in Maryland has been as successful at revitalizing existing buildings as the Heritage Structure Tax Credi{>4. It is a model
of sustainable development and of public/private partnership. Every
dollar of State rehabilitation tax credits generates $8.53 in economic
activity and each million dollars in rehabilitation tax credits generates 72.5 jobs,
[according to] an Abell Foundation report. ... A rating system will be established and only the best projects will be funded. 55
Credit certificates will be granted only to exceptional projects
that score high enough to warrant funding based on criteria
developed in conjunction with the Governor's Smart Growth
Subcabinet. 56
What, by the way, is a "sustainable community"?
50. !d. (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. MD. CODE ANN., Hous. & CMTV. DEV. § 6-201(1) (West 2014)
(<<[S]uslainable community" means the part of a priority funding area that:
(1) as detennined by the smart Growth Subcabinet, satisfies the requirements of § 6-205 of this subtitle; (2) has been designated as a BRAC Revitalization and Incentive Zone under title 5 subtitfe 13 of the Economic
Development Article; or has been designated a lransit-oriented development under § 7-101 of the Transportation article).
53. MD. CODE ANN., HOl)s. & CMTV. DEV. § 6-205 (West 2014)
54. The credits that developers received under the Sustainable Communities
and Heritage Structures programs were against state and local income
taxes, and were realizable when prqjects were completed. Smart, Oreen, and
Growing- The Sustainabw Communities Act of 2010, H.B. 475, 20 to Leg.,
487th Sess. (Md. 2010).
55. The Su.Hainabie Communities Act of 2010, MD. DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING 3
Van. 2010), available (tt http://planning.maryland.gov/PDF /YourPart/SustainableCommllnities/SustainableCommunitiesAct2010.pdf [hereinafter
Sustainabw Communities Act pamphlet] (emphasis added).
56. /d. at 8 (emphasis added).
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They share a common purpose: places where people thrive to enjoy good health and create a high quality of life. A sustainable
community reflects the interdependence of economic, environmental, and social issues by acknowledging that regions,
cities, towns and rural lands must continue into the future
without diminishing the land, water, air, natural and cultural
resources that support them. Housing, transportation and resource conservation are managed in ways that retain the economic,
ecological and scenic values of the environment. And they are communities where the consumption of fossil fuels, emissions
greenhouse gases, water resources and pollution are minimized. 5

?/

To designate an area as a "sustainable community":
(a) The Smart Growth Subcabinet, on the recommendation
of the Secretary, may designate an area as a sustainable community if the sponsor demonstrates that past and current
trends in homeownership, property values, commercial and
residential vacancy, and business or housing investment
show a need for reinvestment in the area and if:

(I) entities in the community, such as local governments, employers, educational institutions, civic organizations, community organizations, or cultural organizations, support the
proposed sustainable community plan and have pledged resources to develop or implement it;
(2) the proposed sustainable community plan addresses the
need for reinvestment in the area and will enhance the
area, and give individuals of different incomes a range of
housing options, employment opportunities, and other
amenities;
(3) a community in the proposed area is culturally or historically significant;(4) the proposed area is near a town center or a transportation center;
(5) the proposed sustainable community plan is consistent with and complements other existing or proposed
prqjects for housing, commercial or community development, education, historic preservation, neighborhood
revitalization, transportation, or other things significant
to the comprehensive enhancement of the community;
or
(6) there is a demonstrated need for financing assistance for small businesses, nonprofit organizations, or
microen terprises. 51'\
The Sustainable Community Act pamphlet goes on to tout a series of
projects across the State that have received Heritage Tax or Sustaina57. M at 7 (emphasis added).
58. MD. CODE ANN., Hous. & eMlY.

DEV.

§ 6-205 (West 2013).
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ble Community credits. 59 Two of the cited Baltimore projects are
Druid Mill at 1500 Union Avenue and Stephanie Pezza's home at 643
South Linwood Avenue. 5O
Druid Mill (also known as Union Mill) is a National Historic Register property that was converted from an industrial property to a mixed
use, residential, retail, and commercial property in 2010 or 201l. 61
The projected project cost of the conversion was $20,000,000, and the
awarded tax credit was $2,920,000. 62 Druid Mill is currently assessed
at $8,487,000. 63 If we assume that $7,500,000 of today's assessed value
is attributable to the mill's rehabilitation funded in part by the Heritage Tax redevelopment subsidy, it will take over sixteen years for the
City and the State to recoup their tax credit investments in Druid Mill
via incremental real estate tax receipts. 64 In plain tenus, Maryland
taxpayers will be out of pocket for over 16 years because of Druid
Mill's rehabilitation.
As with Camden Yards and M&T Bank Stadium, there is an ancillary
benefits argument that was put forth in defense of the public's investment in Druid Mill: the project will supposedly anchor the revitalization of an entire neighborhood. 55 AJJ the photographs attached in
Appendix I attest, this neighborhood revitalization has yet to be felt.
643 South Linwood is a now-rehabilitated row-house in a neighborhood of rehabilitated row-houses. 66 The house cost Ms. Pezza
$440,000 in 2008. 67 The 2010 rehab cost was $241,000 and the Heritage Tax credit was $48,000. 68 643 Linwood is currently assessed at
59. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15-32.
60. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15-16 (these
projects are by way of example, I chose Baltimore projects only because
Harbor Point is a Baltimore project).
61. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15.
62. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15.
63. Real Property Data Search, STATE DEP'T OF AsSESSMENT AND TAX'N http:/ /
sdat.resiusa.org/ReaIProperty /Pages/ defaulLaspx (choose "Baltimore
City" in the county search box and "street address" in the search method
box; then enter "1500" in the Slreet Number box and "Union" in the Slreet
name box) (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
64. Baltimore real estate rates are currently 2.248% of assessed value, the state
rate is 0.112% for a combined rate of 2.360%. 2.360% of $7,500,000 '"
$177,000 per year in new tax revenue. $2,920,000 + $177,000 = 16.50 years
without any consideration for the lime value of the $2,920,000 inveSled (in
the form of a tax credit) up front. See Real Property, BALTIMORE DEp'T OF
FIN., http://cityservices.baltimorecity.gov /realproperty / default.aspx
(search term "Seawall" in the "Owner" search criteria box) (last visited Feb.
J8,2015).
65. See Sustainahle Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15.
66. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphkt, supra note 55, at 15.
67. Real PropertJ Data Search, STATF. DEP'T OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION, http:!
/sdat.resiusa.org/ReaIProperty/Pages/default.aspx (Iasl visited FEB. 18,
2015) (choose "Baltimore City" in the county search box and "street address" in the search method box; then enter "643" in the Street Number
box and "South Linwood" in the street name box) (last visited Feb. ] 8,
2015).
68. See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 16.

70 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development

[Vol. 4

$387,000 69 (as opposed to the $700,000 or so that one might expect
given the purchase price and renovation cost), which implies a negative return on the taxpayer's $48,000 investment. 70 Since it appears
the entire neighborhood - dozens of houses - has been rehabbed,
apparently without public assistance, it is hard to see why the Pezza
property was singled out for Sustainable Communities' support. 7 ]
These two cases may be outliers and may not represent the typical
performance of Maryland's Heritage Structures / Sustainable Communities programs. But these examples were chosen by the state to
showcase these programs. 72 If these are among the best, and presumably they are or why else would they have been cited, we can reasonably conclude that Maryland's taxpayers were sold a bill of goods when
the Sustainable Communities program was presented to them. It explains why nowhere in the rosy language used by the state to explain
and extol the Sustainable Communities program is cost to the taxpayers mentioned.1~
The disconnect between the Sustainable Communities' hype and its
performance raises several key questions I shall address below: who
benefits from public subsidies of private development and who foots
the bill?
As noted above,74 "sustainable communities" are mentioned eight
times in the introduction to HB 613. 75 There are seven further references in the preamble. 76 From this, one might reasonably conclude
that HB 6] 3 is a Sustainable Communities' bill. Such a conclusion
would, however, be incorrect.
HB 613 authorizes municipalities to define special taxing districts?7
that can issue TIFs to finance the costs of infrastructure projects in
any defined area of the city78 - not just in the special taxing district as
long as the project relates somehow to a special taxing district. 79 HB
613 also dedicates revenues from the related special taxing district to
service those bonds. 8o Special taxing district.~ need not be Sustainable
Communities. S ! HB 613authorizes action in, or on behalf of, Sustainable Communities and/or "development district.<;" where "development districts" are defined as any contiguous parcels of land
69. See Real Property Data Search, supra note 63.
70. $440,000 (purchase price) + $241,000 (renovation expense) = $689,000 (estimated assessed value of rehabilitated house). $689,000 - $387,000 (actual
assessed value) = $302,000 (assessed value deficit following renovation).
71. Based on a tour of neighborhood.
72. See Real Property Data Search, supra note 63.
73. See S.B. 285, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010); see also H.B. 1327, 2012 Leg.,
(Md. 2012); see also Real Property Data Search, supra note 63.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
75. See RH. 613, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
76. See id.
77. Jd.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id.
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designated as a development district by municipal resolution.~2 Being
a Sustainable Community may be a sufficient condition when it comes
to TIFs, but it is by no means a necessary condition.H~ As long as a TIF's
proceeds are restricted to certain identified uses (property condemnation and acquisition, relocation of existing occupiers, site clearance,
street~ and sidewalks, utilities, parking g'<lrages, and parks and playgrounds), a municipality can issue all the TIFs it wants, with or without tics to Sustainable Communities, by enacting resolutions that
carve out development and special taxing districts. 4 Hence, the Maryland government was disingenuous to say the least both in its portrayal of sustainable communities in 2010 and in its pretense that HB
613 (and the TIFs authorized by HB 613) has something to do with
them.
Consistent with the observations I made above regarding the likelihood that TIFs may exacerbate municipal cash flow problems in the
short run,Hi> the Department of Legislative Services in its Fiscal and
Policy Note to HB 613 noted that HB 613 will cause a "potential significant increase in annual debt service expenditures for local governments on bonds issued under the bill."86 Fiscal and Policy Notes are
available to the public on the Maryland Assembly's web site, but it is
unlikely they are widely read, much less widely understood. 87 It is
likely that Fiscal and Policy Notes will have less impact on public perceptions of boondoggle-enabling legislation such as HB 613 than will
the puffery of artfully crafted public relations pieces such as the Sustainable Community Act of 2010 pamphlet.
V.

Who Benefits from Private Activity Finance Subsidies?

To understand why there is a disconnect between the hype used to
promote taxpayer development subsidies on a general level as well the
subsidies granted to specific projects, we must identify subsidizations'
winners and the losers.
a.

Developers

Simply put, with taxpayer subsidies, developers make more money
and incur less risk than they do when they undertake unsubsidized
projects. 88 Because of this, developers are likely to support politicians
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
86. DEP'T OF LEGTSLATfVE SERVICES, HB 613 Fiscal and Policy Note (Revised), at
2 (2013 Sess.).
87. General Assembly of Maryland, GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF MARYlAND, http:! I
mgaleg.maryland.gov!webmga!frmlst.aspx?tab=home, (last visited Feb. 18,
2015).
88. See Mark Reutter, Beatty lavished funds on maYfff and City Council as thl!) lavished tax credits on Harb()T Point, BALTIMORE BREW, March 18, 2014, https:/ I
www.baltimorebrew.com/20 14/ 0 3/18 Ibeatty-la vished-funds-on-mayo r-and-
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who vote in favor of subsidies, and show their appreciation by making
regular donations to election campaigns. As long as the "taxes"S9 levied on the developers by the politicians for their support are less than
the subsidies' values to the developers, developers are incented to play
the game. gO
Michael Beatty, the Harbor Point developer is a case in point.
Beatty's projected return on Harbor Point is 14%, versus the 10.7% he
was expecting had there been no subsidies,91 and his risk of failure is
reduced by the subsidies. If the early phases of the development do
not pan out as projected, Beatty can, as a practical matter, stretch out
the project's timetable or stop building entirely.9~ Should this happen and the incremental taxes generated by Harbor Point prove insuft1cient to service its TIF, Baltimore's taxpayers will have to pony Up.93
Beatty is generally understood to contribute to Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and her supporters on the City Counci1. 94
Since HB 613, along with § 5-338 of the Maryland Economic Development Code and § 9-229 of the Maryland Tax Code (sections that deal
with brownfields credits), seems to have been drafted with Harbor
Point in mind, it is likely that Beatty also contributes to members of
the Maryland Assembly.9;' To smooth the way with community groups,
Beatty has agreed to contribute three million toward affordable hous-

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

94.

95.

city-council-as-they-Iavished-tax-credits.on-harbor-point!. The financial
backing of the state taxpayers makes proje::cts less risky to developers.
By "taxes" T mean lhe campaign contributions developers are expected to
make and We non-project amenities such as parks and playgrounds they
are expecte::d to pay for. S& generally id.
Id.
Luke Broadwater, City financing would enable Harbor Point developer to make
$174 million, THE BALTlMORE SUN, June 26, 2013, available at http;! /artides. bal timorcsun .com/20 13-06-26/ news/bs-md-ci-harbor-poin t-profit20 130626_1_harhor-poi n t-the-'bdc~baltimote-develbpmen t-corp/2.
HB 613 does not impose penalties on developers who walk away from TlFfunded projects. See H.B. 613, 2013 Leg., 433rd Sess. (Md. 2013).
See Grmeral Obligation Bonds, MD. STATE TREASURER hup:/ /www.treasurer.state .md. us/ de btmanagemen t/ general-obligation-bonds.aspx (last
visited Mar. I, 2015). If Baltimore is unable to service the Harbor Point TIF,
a state bailout may be required. !d. Although there may be no legal requirement to bail out a failed TIF, failure to do so will adversely impact Maryland's bond rating and drive up the cost of future borrowings. [d. This is
the reason that the federal government felt obligated to step in and guarantee the debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. [d.
Reutter, supra note 88; A Beattyocracy: Rushing through the corparate welfare like
its [sic} nobody's business, BEYOND THE BARRICADE (Aug. 18,2013), https://
beyondbarricade. wordpress.com/20 13/08/18/ a-beattyocracy-rushingthrou&h-corporate-welfare-like-its-nobodys-business/. Of course, most of
Bealty s political contributions would be via PACs, through his business,
and via other structures designed to circumvent campaign finance contributions. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 883
(2010) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976».
Jess Blumberg, F.T AL., Power - Who has it. Who's lost it. And how to get it,
BALTIMORE MAc. (Jan. 2011), http://www.baltimorcmagazine.net!20J 1/1/
power.
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ing - housing that will have no direct relationship to Harbor Point - a
contribution that is covered many times over by the Harbor Point subsidies he will receive. 96
b.

Labor

Construction workers are obvious beneficiaries of subsidized development - with more subsidies there is more development.~n The creation of construction jobs - particularly the assertion of high paid
construction jobs for disadvantaged minorities - is frequently touted
as a key justification for taxpayer subsidies of private development. 9H
But, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), skilled workers
such as electricians and iron workers make roughly $25.00 an hour$50,000 a year. 99 If the justification for project subsidies is to help the
most disadvantaged sections of the inner city, skilled construction
worker jobs are not relevant. Persons who make $50,000 a year do not
usually live in blighted inner city neighborhoods. loo Poor neighborhoods may supply the unskilled labor needed for projects, but these
jobs average less than $30,000 a year in Maryland 10J which is above the
poverty level,102 but not so high as to preclude the job-holders from
still qualifying for public assistance. 103
Skilled construction workers are often unionized, and labor unions
contribute to political campaigns and get out to vote for favored can96. Luke Broadwater, Council committee approves aid Jor HarblJr Point, THE BALTlMORE SUN (Aug. 7, 2013), http://articles.baltirnoresun.com/2013-08-07 /
news/bs-md-ci-harbor-point-committee-20 130807_1 _harbor-poin t-coun cilpresident-bernard-c-beat.ty.
97. See, e.g., Baltimore Dev. Corp., supra note 28.
98. See id.
99. Occupational Employment in Wages - May 2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.
(April 21, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdUocwage.pdf.
100. The Initiative for a Competit.ive Inner City noted that the inner city poverty
rate is 32%. Lena Ferguson, In America's War on Poverty, Inner Cities Remain
the Front Lines, INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETrflVE INNER erIT (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.icic.org/connection/blog-entry/blog-in-americas-war-on-povcrty-inner-cities-rcmain-the-front-line. The federal government's 2014 poverty line for a family of four is $23,850. See also, ObamaCare Subsidies,
OBAMACARE FACTS, hUp:/ /obamacarefacts.com/obamacarc-subsidicsl (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
101. Occupational Employment in Wages - May 2013, supm note 99.
102. The poverty level for a family of fOll r is $23,850 per year. 2014 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://
aspe. hhs .gov/ pove rty / 14poverty.cfm.
103. For example, the cutoff for SNAP assistance (i.e. food stamps) is 130% of
the poverty guidelines - $31,000 for a family of four in 2014. Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Prog;ram (SNAP), U.S. DEP'T OF ACRIC:., http://www
.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibllity. The Affordable Healthcare Act provides subsidies for incomes up to 400% of the poverty guidelines and expanded
Medicaid benefits are available for incomes up to $23,913 for a family of
four. 2()14 Poverty Guidelines, supra note 102.
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didates. 104 Hence, skilled constnlction workers benefit from development subsidies and have the political muscle to encourage them. lor;
One estimate holds that Harbor Point will create 7,000 construction
jobs, many of them unionized and skilled. 106
Post-completion job creation is often lumped in with construction
work as an asserted benefit from development subsidies, but the
claimed benefits fall far short of promise (if, of course, the high-pay
promise had been actually spelled out). 107 Highly paid manufacturing jobs may be hinted at, but these appear to be gone for good. loS
Modern mixed-use projects may attract high quality white collar jobs,
but these don't go to the inner cities' unemployed and under-employed who lack the requisite qualifications. l09 For the most part,
post-completion jobs that benefit the inner cities are in retail and lowskilled services where the pay is only about $10.00 an hour. no $10.00
an hour service jobs reduce, but do not eliminate, the need for public
assistance. 1 1 1 Families living on such wages still qualify for assistance
benefits as SNAP, WIC, EITC and Medicaid. 1 12
104. 14 of the top 25 political contributors for the period 1989 - 2014 are labor
unions. Veronique de Rugy, Fourteen of America's 25 Biggest CamjJaign Donors
Are Unions, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.nationalreview
.com/ corner/372630/ fourtecn-americas-25-biggest-cam paign-donors-areunions-vcronique-de-mgy.
lOS. See id.
106. Broadwater, supm note 96.
107. Baltimore Dev. Corp., supra note 28. The Baltimore Development Corp.
estimated that Harbor Point, in addition to creating 7,175 constmction
jobs, will create 6,611 direct and 2,547 indirect permanent post-construction jobs. Id.
108. If not gone for good, then at least much fewer in 'number. See Patricia Atkins et al., REsjJOnding to Manufacturing Job toss: Mat Can Economic Development Policy Do?, BROOKINGS (June 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/research/files/papers/2011/6/manufacturing%20job%2Oloss/
06_man ufacturingjob ~Ioss. pdf.
109. In America:~ War On Poverty, Inner Cities Remain The Front Line, INTTIAT1VF. FOR
A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY (February 3, 2014), http://www.icic.org/connection/blog-entry/blog-in-americas-war-on-povert y-in n er-ci ties-re main -thefront-line; Governor Cuomo Signs Bill Creating Inner City Youth Employment Program NEW YORK STATE (December 9, 2011), http://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-signs-bill-creating-inner-city-youth-employment-program; and Newshour, Left Behind by the Recovery, 1nner City Teens Struggle to
FindJobs, PUBLIC BROADCAST1NG SYSTEM Uuly, 5 2013), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/business-july-decl3-makingsense_07-05/, among many other
reports, speak to the higher than overall un- and under-employment inner
cities statistics, and the job training programs targeted at this problem.
110. May 2013 National Occupational t-mployrnent and Wage Estimates United States,
39-0000 Personal Care and Service Workers U.S. BUREAU OF u..BOR STATIST1CS
(May 2013), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#39-0000; May
2013 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States, 412000 REtail Sales Workers, U.S. BUREAU OF' LABOR STATISTICS http://www.bls
.gov/oes/current/oes_llat.htm#4I-0000 (last visited Mar. I, 2015).
111. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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Baltimore's Inner Harbor development provides a model of what to
expect from Harbor Point. According to a 2002 study by Kate Davis
and Chauna Bracht:
The downtown area has definitely seen an increase injobs.
Between 1970 and 1995, employment downtown grew by
80%. In fact, all of the city's net job growth since the 1970s
has been in the downtown area, with the bulk of this in tourism related jobs. .. [But the emphasis was on job quantity
rather than job quality.] Typical tourism jobs - such as
waiters, janitors, cashiers, and food service workers - pay
about 46% of the average city wage. All but three of these job
categories pay, on average, less than the federal poverty line
for a family offour ($17,650 per year in 2001) ... These)obs
are dead end with little potential for upward mobility.' 3
That the bulk of post-completion jobs are often low-paid explains
why supporters of development subsidies don't provide wage specificity when they talk about the "high-paying" jobs their projects will create. 1 14 And since retail and service sector jobs are generally not
organized, there is no one or nothing to hold the job promisors' feet
to the fire when the high-paying jobs fail to materialize. 115
c.

Neighbors

"Revitalization" is word often used to justify development subsidies.
It is a word applied to neighborhoods, and neighborhoods imply
neighbors. The neighbors of subsidized developments do not universally see benefits from the subsidies. 116
New, subsidized projects are apt to compete unfairly with their not
so new neighbors. 117 Subsidized development<; that can match (if not
LI3. See Davis & Brocht, supra note 18.
114. Baltimore Development Corporation, supra note 107. For example, provides estimates on numbers of created jobs but is silent when it comes to
pay levels.
115. According to the BLS, the 2013 unionization rate for rctail workers was
5.0%, for food sCIYice workers it was 1.8%, and for building maintenance
workers it was 1l.3% with a weighted average unionization rate of 5.1 %.
U.S. Department of Labor, Economic News Release, BUR£AU OF lAllOR STATISTICS Qanuary 23,2015) http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
2013 and 2014 saw widely-reported, industry-wide strikes by fast food workers and Walmart employees. Id. There were, however, no reports of wage
increases, working condition improvements or benefits gains resulting from
these strikes. Id.
116. The multi-year fight over the Atlantic Yards, Brooklyn NY redevelopment
project is a case in point. Daniel Goldstein, What Is Atlantic Yards? A Complete Failure of Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 201 0), http://www.huffing ton pos t. com / dan iel-goldstcin/what-is-atlan tic-yards-a_b_497229. h tm 1.
117. See Matthew Myers, Insights: Redefining the BaitimVTe CBD, CASSIDY TURLEY,
available at http://dtz.cassidyturley.com/DesktopModulcs/CassidyTurley/
Download/Download .ashx?COI1len tId~2797 &fileName~Downtown +Officc+
Conversiol1+White+Papcr.pdf.
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undercut) the rents offered by their older, unsubsidized neighbors
are likely, in the short run, to put downward pressure on the neighbors' rents, and lower rents may lead to deterioration. I IS If a redevelopment does in fact revitalize its surrounding neighborhood,
revitalization benefits may be a long time coming. 1l9 Also, when revitalization does occur, the resulting upward pressure on rents might
price existing tenants out of the market. 120 Harbor Point exemplifies
both the good and the bad from neighborhood landlord and tenant
perspectives.
Except for a strip along the waterfront on Pratt Street, downtown
Baltimore is not home to upscale retail establishments or class A offlce
buildings, which is characterized by high vacancies. 121 According to
the Baltimore Business Journal:
The downtown vacancy rate [is] between 17 and 18 percent, and ... the total space absorbed was 97,000 square feet
[in the second quarter of 2013], for a total of 186,000 square
feet so far this year. The most competitive real estate continues to be near the Inner Harbor and at Harbor East, as Class
B landlords continue to struggle with high vacancy.122
Harbor Point is slated to add 1.8 million square feet of commercial
space 123 - five years' worth at current absorption rates - to an already
weak market. 124 Given its subsidies, Harbor Point will be able to offer
class A space at class B rents should its developer choose to do 80. 12:;
The opposition of the Downtown Management Association (representing 1,200 downtown landlords) to Harbor Point should have surprised no one. 126
118. Id.
119. Id:
120. GENTRIFICATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, THE: NEW URBAN COLONIZATION, at
5 (Rowland Atkinson & Gary Bridge eds., 2005), available at http://www
.amazon.com/dp/0415329SJ 5/refo,rdr_exCtmb.
121. See generally, Kevin Litten, Baltimore office market slowly recovers, BAIT. Bus. J.
Guly 5, 2013), http://www.bi7journals.com/baltimore/blog/real-estate/
2013/07 /bal tirnore-office-market-slowl y-recovers.htrnl?page=all.
122. Jd.
123. Hamor Point, EE&K ARCTIITECTS, http://www.eekarchitect~.com/portfolio/
l-waterfronts/26-harbor-point (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
124. See Lillcn, snpmnote 121; See generally, Myers, supra note 117.
125. For example suppose that the break-even lease rate for newly constrncted
unsubsidized Class-A commercial space is $25 a square foot. If the subSidy
lowers construction costs by 20%, the break-even lease rate falls to $20.
Further suppose that of the total lease rate, $5 represents unsubsidized real
estate taxes. If, on top of construction subsidies, there is a 50% real estate
tax abatement, the hreak-even lease rate falls to $17.50. For Baltimore this
means brand new C1ass-A space for Class-B prices. See generally, Myers, supra
note 124 and accompanying text.
126. See Mark Reutter, Downtown opposition to Harbor Point T1Fcarries real weight,
BALTIMORE. BREW (August 7, 2013, 2:18 PM), hups:/ /www.baltimorebrew
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Fells Point is a gentrifying, largely residential neighborhood just
east of Harbor PoinL 127 Its property owners will be impacted, if at all,
one way, and its tenant" another. Fells Point property values may rise
due to Harbor Point because people who work in Harbor Point and
want to live nearby may opt for the chann of Fells Point over the newness of Harbor Point. 128 If Fells Point property values go up, so will
Fells Point rents. Fells Point property owners were supportive of Harbor Point because they stand to gain with little downside risk. Fells
Point renters, however, organized in opposition.I~9 They fear being
priced out of their homes. 130
d.

Politicians

Politicians, elected and otherwise, always benefit from development
subsidies. 131 They benefit financial1y by receiving campaign contributions, and by earning bragging rights ("See what bad things I fought
to stop" or "See what good things I brought to my community"). Even
when projects result in spectacular disappointment, the politicians
that appl'oved them are apt to come up winners. Reelections are tomorrow. Failures are realized years down the line, long after the approving politicians have moved on.
Maryland's politics conformed to this scenario. In the Maryland
House of Delegates, the vote on HB 613 was overwhelmingly in favor,
with all opposition coming from Tea Party Republicans (whose seats

127.

.C orn/20 13/08 I 07 / downtown -opposition -to-harbor-point-tif-carries-realweight/.
Scott Calvert., 'Upscale" threatens gritty bars, THE BALTIMORE SUN (November
14, 2004), http://artic1es.balLimoresun.com/2004-1 1-14/news/0411140101
_ljells-whistling-oyster-miss-in:nc; See also, Becoming R~'ntrijied but still neat,
TRlP;illvISOR, http://www.tripadvisoLcorn/ShowU serRcviews g60811-d 1090
74-rl95188.r:i9S Fell_s_Point-Baltimore_Maryland.html (reviewed Feb. 24,
2104); See generally, Fells Point Out of Time, Interview by Kraig Greff with
Vince Peranio, Fells Point Resident (Feb, 11, ~004), transcript available at
http://www.historyatdsk.com/images/ fpooctranscripts/Vincc_Peranio_
021104. pdf.
Greff, supra note 127.
Reutter, supra at note 126.
See supra text accompanying note 129; See also Greff, supra note 127.
See generally ROBERT TRl£ST, THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES FOR COMMUNI'1~
DEVELOl'MENT: A PRIME.R, Smart Subsidy Community Development 10-20
(Fed. Res. Rank of Boston & the Aspen Inst., July 201 1), available at Imps:/
Iwww.boSlonfed.org/commdev/smart-subsidy/ lO-triesLpdf; Brendan
Greely, Why fuel Subsidies in Developing Nations Are an Economic Addiction,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWUK (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
bw/ articles/20 14-03-13/why-fuel~subsidics-in-developing-nations-are-an-ec
onomie-addiction; World Trade Report 2006: The Economics njSubsidies, WORJ.D
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2006), https:1 /VtIWW.wto.org/english/res3/booksp_
e/anrep_e/world_tradejeport06_e.pdf; Global SUbsidies initiative: Subsidy
Primer: Gh. 2 The JJlfectJ of Subsidies: The opportunity cost of subsidies, INTERNA·
TIONAL INSTlTUTE FOR SUSTAINABL.E DEVELOPMENT, http://www.iisd.org/gsi/
effect~-subsidies (last visited Mar. \,2015).
o

o

128.
129.
130.

131.
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are safe in the general election, but who were threatened with primary
challenges had they dared to vote yes).1~2 The state Senate, which
lacked political opposition, voted 46 to 1 in favor of the bill. 133 Baltimore's mayor and city council president were Harbor Point's local
champions; City Councilman Stokes led the opposition. 134 The politicians received far more free press coverage in the weeks leading up to
the project's approval than normally would have been the case. ISS
Mayor Rawlings-Blake and Council President Young received bragging
rights to the job-creating, downtown revitalization project. J 36 Councilman Stokes received a $3 million pledge for affordable housing for his
constituents.1!I7

e.

Taxpaying public

The taxpaying public is the only m~or stakeholder in subsidized
development whose vital interests include project performance. 131l
For the other stakeholders, their gains or losses align with approval
132. Alexander Pyles, House passes development financing bil4 The Daily Rec. (Mar.
23, 2013), h up:/ / thedailyrecord.com/ 20 13/03/ 23/house-passes-development-financing-bil1/; In the 2014 Maryland election only 5 of 47 elections
for the slate Senate were competitive (where competitive means "the winner got less than 55% of the vote~). For the House, 13 of 141 seats were
competitive, see MD Stat.e Senate elections 2014, BALLQTOPEDIA (2014), http://
ball otped ia.org/ Maryla nd_State_Se nate_el ection s,_20 14.
133. Votes: MD HB613 2013 Ref!,Ular Session, LEGISC.AN, https:! /legiscan.com/
MD/votes/HB613/2013 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
134. Luke Broadwater, Critics, sulJparters clash ove'/' Harbor Point deal, THE BALTIMORE SUN (July 17, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-07-17/
news/bs-md-ci-harbor-poi nt-protest-20 130717_l_harbor-poin t-su pportersclash-chairman-carl-stokes/2.
135. Search for articles featuring Councilman Stokes about Harbor Point,
COOGLE, http://www.google.com (search "Councilman Stokes" and "Harbor Point," then click the magnifying glass icon) (displaying the increased
media attention on Councilman Stokes due to the controversy over Harbor
Point). During June, July and August, 2013, Councilman Stokes was mentioned in 81 articles in The Baltimnre Sun. Of these, 11 were related to Harbor Point.
136. See Max Weiss, Harbor Point clash: Project moving forward, despite controversy,
BALTIMORE MAc. (Dec. 2013), http://www.baltimoremagazine.net/2013/
12/ I /20-even ts-of-20 13-harbor-point-proj ect-moving-forward-despitecontroversy.
137. See Luke Broadwater, Harbor Point construction could begin next month, THE
BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 9, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013.{l909/ news/bs-md-ci-harbor-point-council-vote-20 130909_I_harbor-poin t-development-group-jack-young-tax-increment-financing.
138. Most subsidy stakeholders receive benefits from subsidies. Taxpayers pay
for them. If the subsidy takes the form of a direct benefit to the developer
- for example, when the city picks up the cost of the roads and other infrastructure needed by a development - it is the taxpayers who in reality foot
the bill. And if the subsidy takes the form of abated taxes, it is the taxpayers
who must pay more to close the city's resultant revenue gap. See Mark Reutter, Citizens are starting to question Harbor Point 11F subsidies, BALTIMORE BREW
(Aug. 3, 2013 at 2:37PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2013/08/03/
citizens-are-starti ng-to-q uestion-harbor-poi n t-tif-su bsidi es/ .
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and not with performance. 139 The truth of project performance, past
or projected, is more likely to harm non-taxpayer stakeholders than it
is to help them - fewer subsidies would be approved in the future - so
their incentive is to obfuscate and obscure the truth. The taxpayers'
advocates are their elected officials. Since the benefits for elected ofiicials and the benefits for their taxpaying constituents are not in sync
when it comes to development subsidies, the personal interests of the
public officials trump those of the taxpayers.
The public debate that preceded Harbor Point's approval further
illustrates my contention that no one is looking out for the taxpayer. 14f1 The subsidies were criticized for being too generous to the
developer,141 for spending too much money on impractical parks, 14~
for being environmentally unfriendly, 14~ for not reflecting "proper"
priorities,144 and for being unfair to groups that were not privy to the
spoils. 14S What was absent from the entire discussion was any suggestion that an investment of over $200 million of public money might be
anything but good for taxpayers. 146 The Baltimore Sun, citing BDC
analyses, came close but failed to connect the dots. 147 According to
the BDC, Harbor Point would have returned 10.7% if there were no
subsidies and 14% with the subsidies. 148 If the analysis that produced
these numbers is correct, the return on the taxpayers' $200+ million
Harbor Point investment will be zero. 149 Unless there are spillover
139_ See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
140. See Todd Krainin, Harbor Point and Baltimore's 'l'axpayer-Funded Edifice Complex, REASON Gan- 2, 2014), httV/ /reason_com/reiL~ontv/2014/01/08/bal·
timores-edifice-complex,
141. Id.
142. Neily, supra note 2.
143. Timothy "Wheeler and Erin Cox, Harbor Point project stirs environrrll!ntal concerns, THE BALTIMORF SUN (Aug. 31, 2013), 1w.p:/ /articles.ba1timoresun
.com!20 13--08-31 / features/ bs·md·harbor-poi tlt-ch raIn ium·
20 130831_1_harbor-poin Hoxie-chromium ·fells·poin t.
144. Michael Fox and Rachel Kuder, Harbor Point and fair development', THE B.~L
TIMORE SUN (Sept. 12, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013--0912/ news/bs-ed·harbor.poin t· 20 130912_1_harbor·poinHiHair·develop·
ment-united-workers.
145. Mark Reutter, ClnJ!;ymen seek $25 millionfrorn Harbor Point developer Jar "com·
munity benefits", BALTIMORE BREW (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.baltimore
brcw.com/20 131 08/05/ clergymen-request-25.milIion-from.harbor-pointdeveloper-for·communi ty-henefits/.
146. See supra notes 141-45.
147. See supra notes 91, 14445.
148. See supra note 9l.
149. The total pr~jecL costs are projected at $1.027 billion. If all this were paid
for by the developer, his return at 10.7% would equal $110 million. Baltimore will be contributing $107 million via the TIF leaving $920 million t.o
be supplied by the developer. At a 14% return on this investment., the developer's cash income will come to $129 million. This means that ongoing
subsidies (lax abatements mostly) will lower operating costs by $19 million,
the developer will get the $110 million he would have gotten had there
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benefits that will augment the taxpayers' return on investment, Harbor Point could easily saddle them with a IOSS.150
VI.

Conclusion

When it comes to public subsidies of private development, the taxpaying public has not gotten, nor is it likely to get, the return on investtnent it was led to expect. 151 It has been, and likely will continue
to be, misled by unsubstantiated "motherhood and apple pie"
promises of jobs and lower taxes. 152 Rarely, if ever, will the taxpaying
public receive an above-board accounting of cost'S incurred and value
received when it comes to public subsidies of private development. 153
Our system is designed in a way that makes this virtually inevitable.
Too many inside interests benefit when projects are subsidized - the
developers who shepherd the projects through, the organized labor
that builds them, and, most of a1l, the elected officials and bureaucrats
who use these projects to further their careers. 154 If the taxpayers that
provide the subsidies were to get fair value for their money, it will be
by happenstance and not by design.155
VVhen it comes to Harbor Point, the treatment accorded Maryland's
taxpayers may have been even worse than usual. Not only were they
not provided an honest assessment of Harbor Point's costs and risks,
but they were misled by the state's Pollyanna-like pronouncements
and willful misdirection in support of subsidized development, sustainable communities, and tax increment financing in general. 156 At
both city and state levels, the people's representatives committed the
people to courses of action that better serve the interests of those representatives than the interests of their constituents. 157
Is there anything that can be done to remedy this situation? Without major changes to our political system, the answer is no. As long as
those entrusted with guarding taxpayers' interests - their elected and
appointed officials - have interests that don't align iATith those of the
taxpayers, the interests of the officials will take precedence. 15M We
have put a fat kid in charge of the cookie jar. That there are no cookies left for us is the obvious result.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
15fi.
157.
158.

been no TIF, and the taxpayers will be lefL with no return on their investment, at least not for many years. See generally Lukewatcr, supra note 91.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Recall the ongoing taxpayer subsidies needed by M&T Rank Stadium and Camden Yards.
See supra notes 100-03, 114-29, 148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14045 and accompanying text.
See suln-a notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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Table I
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation - Without a TIF
Year

Revenue

I $

2 $
3 $
4 $
5 $
6 $

7
8
9
10

$
$
$
$

1,000
1,020
1,040
1,061
1,082
1,104
1,126
1,149
1,172
1,195

Expe ndi tures
2,000
$
2,040
$
2,081
$
2,122
$
2,165
$
2,208
$
2,252
$
2,297
$
2,343
$
2,390
$

Shortfall
$ 1,000
$ 1,020
$ 1,040
$ 1,06]
$ 1,082
$ 1,104
$ 1,126
$ 1,149
$ 1,172
$ 1,195

Total Shortfall $ 10,950
Table 2
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation - With a TIF
Year

Revenue

1 $
2 $
3 $
4 $
5 $
6 $
7 $
8 $
9 $
]0 $

1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000

Expenditures

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,000
2,040
2,081
2,122
2,165
2,208
2,252
2,297
2,343
2,390

Shortfall
$ 1,000
$ 1,040
$ 1,081
$ 1,122
$ 1,165
$ 1,208
$ 1,252
$ 1,297
$ 1,343
$ ],390

Total Shortfall $ 11,899
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Table 3
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation, Doubled Baseline Service Burden & a TIF
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
]0

Revenue
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$
1,000
$

Expenditures
4,000
$
4,080
$
4,162
$
4,245
$
4,330
$
4,416
$
4,505
$
4,595
$
4,687
$
4,780
$

Shortfall
$ 3,000
$ 3,080
$ 3,162
$ 3,245
$ 3,330
$ 3,416
$ 3,505
$ 3,595
$ 3,687
$ 3,780

Total Shortfall $ 33,799
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THE NEIGHBORHOOD THAT SURROUNDS

